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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  specifies  a  model  of wholesale  flour  price  determination  that  incorporates  risk 
measures for input prices (wheat)  and  a joint output price (millfeed).  Tests using daily price 
data for a Buffalo flour miller indicate that risk premiums do exist.  Moreover, these premiums 
persist in a model that incorporates hedging. TESTING FOR RISK PREMIUMS IN THE WHEAT-FWUR SUBSECTOR 
Introduction 
The theory of the firm when input and/or output prices are risky is well developed.  For 
the risk averse firm under general neoclassical conditions as input price risk increases demand 
for  the input decreases,  and  as  output price risk increases  its  supply of a product decreases 
(Sandmo,  Tumovsky).  Brorsen  et al.  adapted  this  theory to  test for  the existence of a risk 
premium in the wheat/flour subsector.  Using aggregate, i.e. industry level, annual data dating 
from  1964 to  1982 for the U.S. they report that, inter alia, flour millers do incorporate a risk 
premium into flour prices.  They subsequently argue that increased stabilization of wheat prices 
by programs such as the farmer owned grain reserve provide a hereto, fore unmeasured benefit, 
reduction of risk premiums in the flouring marketing channel (Brorsen et. al., p. 527). 
This paper reports results for a similar analysis of risk premiums.  The approach taken 
here, however, provides a more credible test for the following reasons.  First, flour millers sell 
flour to bakery wholesalers on contracts that extend only for 60 to 120 days.  Pric~ quotes for 
these contracts vary daily.  Therefore, the price risk that millers face is best captured by analysis 
of daily data for a firm at a particular location rather than annual aggregate U.S. industry price 
data.  This study analyzes daily data for a one year period for a major flour miller located in 
Buffalo, N. Y.! 
Second,  Brorsen  et al.  assumed  that flour prices  were risky,  when in  fact  the major 
On the other hand, this study of a particular firm and location may not generalize to all firms and 
locations, but we know of no particular reasons that suggest this. 
1 sources of price risk are variation in the input (wheat) price and variation in the joint output 
(millfeed) price.  It is preferable to  develop  and  analyze measures  of wheat price risk and 
millfeed price risk, as is done in this paper.  Wheat and millfeed price risks are not perfectly 
correlated, so a given risk level (e.g. variance) in output price can come from several different 
combinations of wheat and millfeed price risk levels. 
Finally, there is a futures market where one possibly can hedge to reduce wheat price 
risk; but, there is no futures market for millfeed. In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of 
hedging  in  wheat  futures  and  evaluate the impact of covariance  effects  between  wheat and 
millfeed prices on flour prices.  These risk diversification effects have been ignored in prior 
research on risk premia. 
ll.  Model Specification 
Assuming that flour millers maximize expected utility of  profits and that flour millers are 
price takers (Le.  the industry is effectively competitive)2 a flour miller's choices when wheat 
and millfeed price are risky is as follows: 





f(F,MF,W,z)  =  0 
= 
the utility of profits 
price of flour 
quantity of flour 
Brorsen et.  aI.  similarity assume a competitive industry structure (p.  522). 
2 Pmf  -
MF  -
Pw  = 
r  -
Z  -
f(F,MF,W,Z)  = 
price of millfeed 
quantity of millfeed 
price of wheat 
vector of other input prices 
vector of other inputs 
is the production function for the joint output of flour and millfeed 
from wheat and other inputs. 
Tildes denote random variables. 
This utility function U is assumed to be increasing (U'  <Jl)  >  0)  and concave (U"  <Jl) 
< 0)  so this analysis focuses  upon a risk averse firm.  Moreover as Brorsen etal. notes,  the 
production function for the joint output of flour and millfeed is weakly separable between the 
wheat  input  and  other  inputs  with  a  fixed  proportion  production  technology  holding  the 
relationship between wheat input and outputs (1  unit wheat produces .725 units flour and .275 
millfeed). 
One can derive an empirically testable form of this model.  If  only an output price were 
risky it is identical to the Brorsen et.al. model.  If  only an input price were risky it is identical 
to Turnsovsky (1969) and Batra and Ullah (1974).  Combining the two approaches in one and 
employing the fixed proportion production technology feature of flour milling one can derive a 
risk responsive supply function for flour and millfeed that has the following general form: 
(2) 
F· i. s the joint output of flour and millfeed.  This output is a function of the price of flour, the 
expected price of feed, the expected price of wheat, the price of other inputs (non wheat milling 
3 inputs), and three risk measures:  the variance in millfeed prices, the variance in wheat prices, 
and the covariance of wheat and millfeed prices. 
One can invert this function to a price independent form (Hein).  Also recognizing that 
the output of flour and millfeed can be expressed as the quantity of wheat milled, and that in this 
short run analysis the prices of nonwheat milling inputs can be reasonably assumed constant one 
can obtain an estimable equation that is: 
(3)  Pr =  {3o  + {31  P  w  + {32  W + {33  P  mf + {34  WRISK + {3s  MFRISK + {36  COY  AR 
Hypotheses:  {31  >0  {32  <0  {33  <0  {34  >0  {3s  >0 {36  <0 
where:  =  daily contract flour price announced by the mill 
P  w  =  price of wheat 
W  =  quantity of wheat milled 
P  mf  =  price of millfeed 
WRISK  =  wheat price risk measure 
MFRISK  =  millfeed price risk measure 
COY  AR  =  covariance of wheat and millfeed prices 
Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion  one can deduce the following  hypotheses. 
The price of flour is hypothesized to be positively related to the price of wheat and negatively 
related to the price of millfeed.3  In this short run model, the quantity of wheat milled expected 
to  have a negative impact upon flour prices because demand is relatively stable and increased 
3  The Brorsen et al.  model analyzed farm  mill  margins rather than flour prices, however on can 
obtain that margin in this model by subtracting {31  P  w  +  {33  P  mf from  both sides of equation 3. 
In our work we use the prior days price of wheat and millfeed as  a measure of expected prices. 
4 supply will depress price.  The coefficients for WRISK and MFRISK are hypothesized to  be 
positive and  as  such  provide measures  of the risk premia incorporated in  flour prices.  The 
coefficient on COY AR is hypothesized to be negative.  If  millfeed prices increase when wheat 
prices do, then the increased income from millfeed will offset some of the increased outlay for 
wheat,  thereby providing some reduction in risk. 
Hedging can  be incorporated into this  model  by using  the nearby  futures price as  the 
measure of P  w and the variance of observed basis risk as a measure of the net-of-hedging wheat 
price risk.  Alternatively, one can use a measure of expected basis risk, termed the effectiveness 
of hedging ratio,  which is the square of the correlation of cash and  future price (Johnson,  p. 
215).  Flour millers can price flour off the nearby futures by using a technique called operational 
hedging  (English,  Working).  Basing  their flour price on  the futures,  they  hedge by  buying 
nearby futures.  Assuming no basis risk (i.e. a perfect hedge) they avoid all wheat price risk and 
their grain  procurement department has  time  to  assemble  the grain  needed  to_  meet contract 
commitments. 
ill.  Empirical Results 
Data provided  by  a large wholesale  distributor of bagged  bread  flour  provides  daily 
contract flour prices from  September 11,  1986 to September 11,  1987 for patent bread flour, 
f.o.b.  Buffalo,  for a major flour miller.  We were able to assemble  from  other sources,  the 
corresponding Minneapolis cash  and  futures price for  14 % hard  spring  wheat,  and a weekly 
average  millfeed  price  f.o.b.  Buffalo.  Daily  millfeed  prices  were  not  available.  Also  the 
quantity of flour milled in Buffalo was not available, however we were able to obtain a monthly 
mill output rate for the U.S. as a proxy for short-run supply pressure on prices. 
5 Price risk measures were computed using a 20 day weighted  moving average variance 
with  the most recent day receiving a weight of 20, the previous day  19,  the next  18  etc.4  A 
measure of Johnson's hedging effectiveness ratio was computed for each day by computing the 
squared correlation coefficient for cash and futures prices for this preceding 20 days.  Similarly 
the covariance measure for wheat and  millfeed was computed using a 20 day  moving average 
formula. 
Table  1 reports  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  sample.  Patent  bread  flour  prices 
averaged $14.85 per cwt. and ranged from a low of $13.56 to a high of $15.91 during the year. 
Wheat futures,  wheat cash,  and  millfeed prices also  exhibit considerable variation.  Basis  is 
negative with an average value of -$.607 and ranges from -.89 to -.31.  Thus the Minneapolis 
price for 14%  protein hard wheat, a high quality wheat, is consistently above the Minneapolis 
futures price. This inverted basis does not preclude hedging.  The effectiveness of operational 
hedging depends on how closely the two price series are correlated, i.e. the existence of  a stable 
basis relationship.  Looking, however at the observed variation in basis and E, the effectiveness 
of hedging ratio, it appears that hedging conditions are considerably less than perfect.  Recall 
that E is the square of the correlation coefficient between cash and futures.  If E is near 1 than 
hedging is nearly perfect.  If  it is near zero,  hedging does little to  reduce price risk.  In this 
sample E averages  .62 and  ranges  from  effectively zero  to  .97.  At some times in  the year 
hedging is not effective, but at others it is very effective as a risk reducing mechanism. 
4 
The 20 day weighted moving average variances for cash wheat price, millfeed price, and 
For mill feed prices the reported week's average price was used for each day in the week and the 
daily weighted moving average variances were computed  on this series.  Theory provides no 
guidance for choosing the length of the period or the weight.  We tried other measures, and our 
qualitative results are not sensitive to the computation of risk measures. 
6 basis  also  indicate that variation  in  these  risky  prices  is  not  constant over the  time period. 
Riskiness fluctuates as well as expected prices.  Similarly there is considerable variation in the 
measures of the covariance of wheat and millfeed prices. 
Table 2 reports estimation results.  All equations are corrected for autocorrelation by 
using the Cochrane Orcutt procedure.  Equation 1 indicates that cash wheat prices are a positive 
and highly significant determinant of flour prices as hypothesized.  The quantity of wheat milled 
in the U.S. during the month, also behaves as hypothesized with a negative coefficient that is 
not quite significant at the 5 percent level.  Our measure of wheat price risk, the 20 day weight 
moving average of cash wheat prices is positive as hypothesized but not significant.  Equation 
2 introduces the Buffalo millfeed price and the mil1feed price risk variables to the model.  Their 
addition dramatically improves the model, increasing the significance of the cash  wheat price 
variable,  establishing  the  significance of the  wheat  quantity  variable at the  1 percent level. 
Buffalo  millfeed  price  is  negatively  related  to  flour  price  as  hypothesized  and  is  highly 
significant with a t-ratio of 16.8.  The cash variance measure of wheat price risk continues to 
be positively related to flour price and is now significant at the one percent level.  Flour prices 
appear to  contain a risk premium related  to  cash  wheat price fluctuations.  Our measure of 
millfeed price risk and the covariance of wheat and millfeed prices, however do not perform as 
hypothesized.  The 20 day weighted moving average variance for millfeed prices is negatively 
related to price and significant at the 5 percent level.  The covariance term also has the wrong 
sign  (positive) but is not significant.  With a regression  R2  of .77 and  total  R2  of .82.  This 
model explains a significant proportion of the observed variation in flour prices, but these are 
not high R2 for time series analysis. 
7 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics  (252 observations)* 
Standard  Minimum  Maximum 
Variable  Mean  Deviation  Value  Value 
FLOUR PRICE  14.8568  0.5321  13.5600  15.9100 
(cwt.) 
WFUTURES  4.4958  0.1500  4.2083  4.8875 
WCASH  5.1047  0.2073  4.6042  5.7333 
MILLFEED  (cwt.)  2.4259  0.5613  1.3200  3.3000 
BASIS  -0.6092  0.1144  -0.8917  -0.3167 
WQTITY  65.6593  2.6775  61.5810  71.1130 
(U.S.  monthly) 
VAR20CSH  0.0112  0.0095  0.0011  0.0510 
VAR20MILL  0.0414  0.0494  0.0016  0.2597 
VAR20BAS  0.0044  0.0036  0.0004  0.0181 
COVMILL/FUT  -0.0005  0.0115  -0.0215  0.0509 
COVMILLICASH  -0.0020  0.0147  -0.0358  0.0584 
COVMILL/BASIS  0.0015  0.0080  -0.0175  0.0264 
COVMILLlE  0.0008  0:0052  -0.0123  0.0342 
E  0.6200  0.2837  0.0001  0.9670 
*  All wheat prices are for hundredweight flour equivalents  (2.3 bu.) 
8 Table 2.  Contract Flour Price Determination Models • 
Mill Feed  Covar 
Wheat Price  Wheat  Mill Feed  Wheat Risk  Risk  Millfeed/Wheat  Reg  Total 
Measure  Result  Quantity  Price  Measure  Result  (20 Day Var.)  Measure  Result  Intercept  R2  R2 
1.  CASH  1.3333  -.0145  Var 20  2.8070  8.9718  .4456  .7800 
(13.791)·  (-1.645)  Cash  (1.462)  (11.345)· 
2.  CASH  1.5486  (-.0394)  -.5670  Var 20  11.0586  -.6532  Millfeed  1.5798  10.8268  .7736  .8261 
(19.286)·  (-5.891)·  (-16.802)·  Cash  (6.494)·  (-1.805)··  Price  (1.515)  (16.532)· 
Cash Wheat 
3.  FUTURES  1.4863  -.0081  Hedge  .0169  8.6426 
(12.014)·  (-.902)  Effect (E)  (.352)  (10.993)·  .370  .8111 
4.  FUTURES  1.6870  -.0246  Var 20  10.578  8.8275 
(11.245)·  (-2.555)·  Basis  (1.796)··  (9.237)·  .3592  .7123 
5.  FUTURES  1.7064  -.0375  -.4382  Hedge  .0779  .4990  Millfeed  -1.3021  (10.6330) 
(14.227)·  (-4.720)·  (-10.766)·  Effect(E)  (1.527)  (1.558)··  Price, E  (-.411)  (13.766)·  .6058  .8251 
0\ 
6.  FUTURES  1.8782  -.0410  -.4551  Var 20  2.0471  .6011  Millfeed  2.0365  (10.1690 
(15.221)·  (-5.309)·  (-10.842)·  Basis  (.417)  (1.717)··  Price, Basis  (1.200)  (12.886)  .6353  .8069 
252 observations in sample.  GLS results (corrected for autocorrelation) are reported. 
•  Significant at 1% level. 
••  Significant at 5% level. Equations 3 through 6 in Table 1 report estimation results for models that assume the 
fIrm  hedges  to  reduce  wheat price risk.  In equation  3  wheat  futures  price is  positive and 
signifIcant as hypothesized.  The quantity of wheat milled in the U.S. during the month has the 
hypothesized negative sign but is not signifIcant.  lohnson's measure of hedging effectiveness, 
E, was hypothesized to be negatively related to flour prices:  it is positive but not signifIcantly 
different from zero.  Equation 4 introduces the 20 day weighted  moving average variance of 
basis as the measure of basis risk for a hedged flour miller.  It is positive as hypothesized and 
signifIcant at the 5 percent level. 
Equation 5 introduces millfeed price, millfeed price risk and the covariance of millfeed 
price  with  the  effectiveness  of hedging  measure.  As  with  the  cash  wheat  models  their 
introduction dramatically improves the model.  Wheat futures price, wheat quantity, and millfeed 
price have the hypothesized sign and are signifIcant at the one percent level.  The effectiveness 
of hedging continues to have an expected positive sign, but it is not signifIcant at the 5 percent 
or better level. .  The millfeed price risk variable is positive as hypothesized and signifIcant at the 
5  percent level.  The covariance of millfeed price and  hedging  effectiveness  is negative as 
hypothesized but not signifIcant. 
Equation  6  gives  similar  strong  results  for  wheat  futures  price,  wheat  quantity  and 
millfeed price.  The variance of basis is positive as hypothesized but not signifIcant.  Millfeed 
price variance has the hypothesized positive sign and is signifIcant at the 5 percent level.  The 
covariance  of millfeed  and  basis  does  n'ot  have  the  hypothesized  negative  sign  and  is  not 
signifIcant. 
10 Summary and ConClusions 
These results provide at best weak support for the hypothesis that flour millers factor a 
basis risk into the pricing equation, and thus suggest that operational hedging has little impact 
on flour prices.  In the best hedging model (equation 6) there is no risk premium associated with 
variance in  the basis for wheat,  but a weak premium seems  to  exist for risk in  the  millfeed 
market.  Possibly hedging is occurring and the flnn enjoys near perfect hedges so the variance 
in basis is so small that it is not a signiflcant factor in the flrm pricing.  As we noted, however, 
when discussing the descriptive statistics contained in Table I, there is considerable variance in 
basis, and the effectiveness of hedging ratio.  Thus near perfect.hedging conditions do not exist, 
and this special case can be ruled out. 
On the basis of goodness of flt the cash wheat price models seem to do a little better than 
the hedging models.  In the best cash wheat price model, wheat prices,  wheat quantity milled, 
and  millfeed  prices  are  the  strongest  determinants  of flour  prices.  Flour prices  also  are 
positively and strongly related to wheat price risk as measured by the weighted 20 day moving 
average variance of cash prices. 
Further research  might explore the robustness of these results during different periods 
of the marketing year.  The model  may  perform differently,  for example,  during harvest as 
opposed to  the storage  months.  The results  reported  here and  this  suggested  extension  can 
certainly  be useful  for  flrms  selling  and  buying  flour,  and  possibly  for  agricultural  policy 
decision makers who wish to devise grain reserve release rules that reflect not only the existence 
of a risk premium in the wheat-flour subsector but also its sensitivity to time of year. 
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a paper that was delivered at a conference or symposium but not published. It may be a research 
report that  ultimately appears in  full  or abbreviated form as  a journal article or  chapter in  a book. 
Using the  working  paper series  enables a researcher to  distribute the  report more quickly and 
in  more  extensive  detail  to  key  research  users.  A working  paper  may  also  be  an  end  product 
in  itself,  for  example,  papers that  collate  data, report  descriptive  results,  explore  new  research 
methodologies, or stimulate thought on research questions. 
Procedures: Working  papers  may  address any  issues  in  the  food  and  agricultural  marketing 
area as described in the NE-165: Private Strategies, Public Policy and Food System Performance, 
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copies of working papers are available from the author or from the Food  Marketing Policy Center 
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